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An experimental analysis of the blockchain-based data-sharing system in improving inter-organizational cooperation. 

​Mira Toumi, Marta Ballatore M. and Lise Arena (2021)

* Université Côte d’Azur, France


New European legislation could oblige companies to share certain data. To anticipate this regulatory change, companies are starting to think about new management tools to increase the added value of their data. In a traditional ecosystem, creating an inter-organizational environment for data sharing requires security, trust, control practices and contracts, thus generating high costs. Apart from these costs, this method of sharing does not guarantee the cooperation of all trading partners. From the point of view of experimental economics, this situation can be studied through the prism of the “commons” constituted by the data shared by all the members of an ecosystem and which would lead to positive externalities for companies and for the market. However, there may be times when a partner decides to turn away from their initial commitment to sharing data and take advantage of their partners' engagement without incurring the cost.
In this study, we deploy the literature around the commons to study the effectiveness of a blockchain-type data sharing system in improving cooperation and inter-organizational coordination. We are also interested in the role of managerial cognitive biases in decision-making to adopt blockchain as a new form of inter-organizational exchange.



Endogenous threshold public goods:learning to contribute

P. Zeppini*, M. Toumi*, S. Montagnana** and A. Festré*

Université Côte d’Azur, France

** University of Bath, UK


Environmental challenges like climate change and ecosystems degradation are social dilemma of public goods contribution, plagued by free-riding. In this project we expand on the idea of environmental club goods or `crowdaction' as a viable solution based on endogenous cooperation driven by social influence. We propose a discrete choice model in a population framework, named the Garden Model, which allows to analyse analytically and experimentally possible learning pattern towards cooperation. We compare different settings: one is an entry game, where the externality of social interactions can work as an endogenous threshold - critical mass - for the decision to join the Garden club.

A second version confronts the players with a double stage decision: joining the club and how much to contribute. The latter version allows for a general setting where contributions can be negative, and describe exploitation of the public good. The different settings of the model entail positive feedback scenarios, with possible multiple equilibria and negative feedback scenarios, with possible periodic dynamics. The ultimate goal of the project is to evaluate aggregate contributions, measured as the Garden beauty. The setting with positive feedback can present the counterintuitive scenario where for positive shocks on marginal contribution benefits, individual contributions increase, while the resulting Garden beauty decreases. The model is designed for the different equilibrium outcomes to be tested in laboratory experiments.

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